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Vorster described the events of 1976 as just *the whirlwind K
storm', and events since 1984 have confirmed his judgement. ° r e
whereas the protests and conflicts of 1976-77 were focussed
(although they did spread widely across South Africa E13), the
gales of the *storm' in 1984-85 largely passed Soweto by. J'Sowt
schools were relatively unaffected by the school protests and boycott
which swept through the Eastern Cape, Pretoria, the East Rand and th :
Vaal Triangle in 1984- Sowetc's residents were not drawn!-.up into the
protests over rent increases which convulsed the northern'Orange Free ^
State, Vaal Triangle, Pretoria and East Rand between Junevand
September 1984- When the Eastern Cape erupted in February and March
1985, SowetD stayed generally quiet, as it continued to be when bloody
conflict swept the East Rand again in May and June, and the Western
Cape and Durban from August. Consumer boycotts in Soweto in the
second half of 1985 lacked solid support, and there was only patchy
participation in stayaways. In the first nine months of 1985, only 17
people were reported killed in ^unrest* in Soweto, compared to 11O on
the East Rand, for example E23. Soweto"'s councillors not only clung
to office but also continued to live in the township itself, unlike
many of their counterparts elsewhere who were herded into fortified
compounds or put up in hotels outside of their townships. It was only
in the last three months of 1985, and more especially in mid 1386-,
that protests ceased to be sporadic, transitory and disparate, and
overt conflict in Soweto matched that elsewhere in the country. Why?
This paper addresses this question through an examination of Soweto
betweeen 1978 and 1984. In so doing it is a very preliminary attempt
to explore a broader issue, namely the nature of "quiescence".
"Quiescence", or the apparent absence of overt struggle, is a more
general phenomenon than overt protest or revolt, yet receives very
little critical attention- In examining "quiescence" in Soweto I
focus on a range of factors, including1 (1) the social structure of
Soweto; (2) the state's prioritisation of urban development in Soweto
since 1979, its wariness of revolt, and its use of relatively
sophisticated policing; (3) the chronic unimportance of the Soweto
Council in township politics; and (4) the character o-f opposition
politics and the experience of struggle during the period 1977-84. I
hope that, this paper begins to illustrate how "quiescence" should not
simply be understood in terms of a process (of transformation to
protest or revolt) that did not, happen, but rather as the outcome of
the interaction of a set of processes (including processes of struggle
and limited overt protest) that did happen, and that did indeed
transform township politics although in ways which led to continued
"quiescence" rather than widespread overt revolt.
Soweto's social structure1 Differentiation and Incoheaion
Greater Soweto covers about 40 square miles, including the administ-
ratively distinct but geographically contiguous townships of Diepkloof
and Meadowlands ("Diepmeadow") and Dobsonville. The official popul-
ation census put its population at B£9,000 in 1980, but other sources
estimate the population to be much higher. The Urban Foundation
estimated one million in 1980, civic leader Nthatho Mot1 ana claimed in
1982 that ^everybody' knew that the population was about 1-5 mill ion,
and John Knoetze (the chairman of the West Rand Administration Board,
WRAB) accepted a figure of 1.2 million that same year. According to
the 1985 census 107. of residents are aged 4 or under, 307. between 5
and 19, IT/, 'between 20 and 24,-452 between 25 and 64, and 47. agud 65
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or more C33. In 1978 there were just 102,000 houses in Greater
Soweto, mostly the standard 51/6 and 51/9 '•matchbox' models. Only 3%
of the houses had more than 4 rooms t43. The severe overcrowding and
general poverty o-f 1 iving conditions in what was just seen as a
'dormitory city' were detailed in studies o-f the 1976-77 revolt, and
officially acknowledged in the Report of the Cillie Commission C53.
Whilst overcrowding and spartan living conditions have been widespread
in townships throughout the PWV (Pretoria Witwatersrand Vaal region),
the social and economic structure of Soweto does have distinct
features. First, the sectoral and occupational distribution Df
employment of Soweto residents is very dissimilar to those on the East
Rand and Vaal Triangle (although more similar to the pattern in
Pretoria). Household incomes are higher, chances of individual
occupational mobility greater, and the possibilities for workplace
organisation (whether formal or informal) reduced. Secondly,
processes of economic differentiation are particularly marked, and are
increasingly reflected in the social geography of Soweto. Together
these factors militate against the emergence of a strong sense of
community, especially at the level of Soweto as a 'whole' but also in
townships within Soweto. The effects on political organ-
the changing social structure of Soweto were compounded in
197B-84 by the importance of Soweto-wide grievances and the
responses of political activists. Thus the focus of much
organisation was at a level and in a form in which the
individual
isation of
the period
particular
political
prospects for success were poorest
The most recent phase of the transformation of the political economy
of the PWV has involved the growth of the tertiary sector of the
economy and of the role of blacks within it. The changing pattern of
employment is particularly pronounced in Soweto. Appendix A shows the
occupation by economic sector of economically active black people in
the Johannesburg, East Rand, Vaal Triangle, and Pretoria areas. The
proportion of employees in manufacturing in the Johannesburg area is
just 21%, compared to 35% on the East Rand and 34% in the Vaal. The
proportion of employees in the service sector is 5B%, as opposed to
38% and 37%. Even within sectors there are significant differences.
Only 30% of manufacturing employment in the Johannesburg area is in
the metals industry, compared to 52% on the East Rand and 61% in the
Vaal, whilst light manufacturing (e.g. food, beverage, tobacco,
textiles, clothing, footwear, printing and publishing) accounts for a
much higher share of employment in the Johannesburg area. The pattern
of employment in the Pretoria area is similar to the Johannesburg area
in terms of the division of employment between manufacturing and
services, but not between different manufacturing sub-sectors.
There are several consequences of this pattern of employment. First,
incomes in Soweto are higher than elsewhere in the PWV. The Bureau of
Market Research (BMR) at the University of South Africa estimated
average household and per capita incomes in Soweto 1985 to be R9,624
and Rl,756, and put growth of real per capita incomes at 6.7% pa
between 1970-1975, -2.0% pa between 1975-19B0, and 5-1% pa between
1980-1985 C63. These estimates have been criticised as exaggerated
C73, but data for relative income levels are more acceptable.
Secondly, Soweto residents have differential access to better- paying
employment, ie that whilst some have such jobs, many do not, and this
results in unusually wide income inequalities within Soweto. This I
consider in greater detail below. Thirdly, Soweto residents are
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employed in less unionised <and less easily unionisable) sectors
Furthermore, Soweto residents &re generally employed in'much smaller
workplaces than their counterparts elsewhere in the PWV, even within
the same sector. The average number of black employees in a
manufacturing establishment in the Johannesburg area is 29, compared
to 56 on the near East Rand, £1 in Pretoria, and 31 on the far East
Rand/Vaal area- Even within the metals industry, for example, the
average is 31 in Johannesburg, compared to 56 on the near East Rand
and 61 in Pretoria t83« The formation of any collective
workplace-based consciousness, yet alone trade union consciousness or
organisation, is severely impaired. The absence.of trade unions in
township politics in Soweto is not at all surprising.
The importance of
important because
demands placed on
population at the
residential areas
the pattern of employment of Soweto residents is
it interacts with residential patterns and the
township organisations- The fragmentation of the
workplace is matched by its fragmentation within the
of Soweto. On the basis of the 1970 population
census data, Morris identified some broad differences between areas of
Soweto. Soweto's south-western townships (Naledi, Moletsane, Mapetla,
Tladi), and Chiawelo, are inhabited by more recent arrivals, Sotho/
Tswana and Shangaan-speaking respectively, with slightly lower-
educational qualif ifications and incomes 133. In 1977 Hlophe
contrasted commuters on the trains *the predominantly white-collar
middle class districts of Phefeni, Dube and Mofolo' who travelled into
Johannesburg's Park Station and jobs in commerce and other services
with the commuters from south-western Soweto who took the Booysens-
Westgate-Faraday line to the industrial areas of southern Johannes-
burg. People in the ^higher-income districts* of Dube, Mofolo and
Rockville, he wrote, *were considered arrogant by the rest of Soweto.
They were strongly Euro-American in their style of life, and very much
concerned with conspicuous consumption*. In Dube, ^Interhousehoid
relations tended to be distant and noncommittal, in conformity to
white suburban living patterns, which Dube residents were trying hard
to emulate' C103. By 19B0 Morris was pointing to elite housing areas,
both old (Dube South) and new (Beverley Hills, in Orlando West
Extension, and Rockville, in southern Moroka), although she emphasised
that these remained only small pockets in Soweto as a whole CUD. The
1980 census data reveals uneven incomes and employment patterns,
although this unevenness remains limited C123.
Since 19B0, geographical inequalities have probably increased
significantly, although I am unaware of evidence to assess this.
Certainly the state's housing policy has allowed the accelerated
development of (relatively) elite residential areas, including
Selection Park (in Pimville) and Prestige Park (in Diepkloof) C133.
The effects of differentiation have been acknowledged- It was
reported that the new Selection Park residents were accused of being
'snobs, who have changed their attitudes so drastically that they no
longer seem part of the community', and other Sowetans say that *they
have lost all the warmth one never misses elsewhere in Soweto', they
only know each other by the posh cars they drive- Selection Park
residents see themselves as *still swimming in the same waters with
every other black', but admit that other Sowetans view them
differently ••
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-Everybody talks about us being "token" blacks. There is
resentment. Looking back, I wish I hadn't moved to a
middle-class area, because of this credibility problem. I in
seen differently from when I was living in a regular
neighbourhood in Soweto.' C143
It is important not to overemphasise the dif-ferences between different
parts of Soweto.. The housing shortage, -for example, inhibits
residential mobility and the emergence o-f income-de-fined areas- But
differences, in the context of the sheer size of Soweto, encourage the
formation of more local rather than Soweto-wide consciousness, and
weakens Soweto-wide cohesion. Even at a local level, cohesion is
reduced by increasing inequalities, together with patterns of
employment.
Data for household incomes are generally unreliable, but most surveys
concur on the following trends1 <1> Between 1S70 and 19S5 average
household and per capita real incomes in Soweto rose, although whether
by much is disputed; (2) they did not rise smoothly, and even average
incomes fell during the late 1370s; and, most importantly in terms of
the social structure of Soweto, inter-household income distribution
grew more unequal. According to the BMR surveys, the proportion of
households with income below R4,000 pa (in constant 1385 prices) rose
from 14-47. in 1975, to 21.3V. in 19S0, to 23.2"/. in 1985. The
proportion of households with incomes above R12,000 pa (also in
constant 19S5 prices) fell from 14.7"/. in 1975 to 9.37. in 1980, but
rose to 25. IV. in 1985. The proportion of households in the lowest
income group had risen by half again, whilst the proportion of
households in the top income group had risen by well over half again,
over the same ten-year period. C153
Widening income differentials could be due to a high rate of in-
migration, with new arrivals swelling the proportion of poor house-
holds until their incomes also begin to rise. However, it is not
clear that rates of in-migration to Soweto before 1985 were higher-
than elsewhere in the PWV, and surveys consistently show that most
adult Sowetans have been resident for a long time C163. It seems
more likely that widening income differentials are due to differential
access to the broadly burgeoning employment and entrepreneurial
opportunities in the area. Between 1975 and 1985, earnings of Soweto
residents employed as professionals or skilled labour rose vGr-y
rapidly, whilst unskilled labour earnings fell in real terms, and
unemployment rose C173. The size and high incomes of Soweto also
provide a wide range of opportunites for entrepreneurial activity.
According to the BMR, the proportion of average household income
coming from Knet profits'* more than trebled between 1975 and 19B5,
rising from 3.7V. to 12.3V. C183. The number of business licenses in
Soweto rose from 1293 in January 1983 to 2345 in January 1931 and 2348
in January 1984 C193. A study of Moroka found that only 97. of people
working in the ^informal sector1' were licensed C203. There were an
estimated 3,000 hawkers (mostly in food) and 4,000 shebeen-operators
in Soweto C213. In many cases entrepreneurship was a means of
survival at a time of high unemployment and (for many households)
poverty incomes, but for some households entrepreneurial activity has
provided very great wealth. At the extreme are the estimated seven
millionaires in Scweto, including Ephraim Tshabalala (Mayor in 1984,
whose interests include a a filling station, a dry cleaning business,
shops, a cinema - used for SofasorikE? Party meetings, and a nightclub;
and sugar cane and wattle farms i,-, KwaZulu) and Richard Mapor.ya (whose
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interests include a dairy, a butchery and other shops, a service
station - Mountain Motors, reputedly the biggest in the Southern
Hemisphere, and a massive supermarket complex in Cube) C223.
Income distribution in Soweto appears to be more uneven than in other
parts o-f the PWV, although the differences seem to be getting less
over time. Appendix 2 provides comparative data for Soweto and other
areas. Uneven, and increasingly uneven, income distribution does not
necessarily lead to social incohesion. But in South African townships
in the 1980s uneven income distribution combined with the other
factors above to reduce any sense of '•community'- It also meant that
material grievances (or at least grievances with a substantial
material content) such as rent, busfare, and price increases had an
unevenly important material effect and consequently provided an uneven
impetus to political mobilisation and protest- The occupational
pattern in Soweto also influenced (although clearly did not determine)
the form which organisations and protest took, as I shall discuss
below.
The Character of Township Politics
The social structure of Soweto provides more of an impetus for a local
rather than Soweto-wide sense of 'community*, although even the former
is inhibited- Indeed, support for a wide range of political organis-
ations in Soweto is very unevenly spread across the area, and their
strength tends to be concentrated in particular parts- However, the
nature of some key grievances (local government, education, rents, the
housing shortage), the existence of a nationally-aware political
intelligentsia, and the national importance of Soweto, provide an
impetus to Soweto-wide organisation, ie at a level which is at
something of a disjuncture with the townships' social structure.
Soweto was the first black township in the PWV to have its own radical
civic organisations the 'Committee of Ten' (ColO), established as the
'Soweto Local Authority Interim Committee' in late June 1977, which
transformed itself into the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) in 1373.
The ColO became the executive committee of the SCA, and kept the name
even when the committee membership was changed in 19B2, The name was
finally dropped in December 1934, when the SCA executive was
substantially restructured in style as well as personnel.
At a workshop held in June 1384 to develop organisational skills the
SCA was frank in its critical appraisal of its organisational
failures, especially since 13B0- The workshop identified the SCA's
campaign against rent increases in 1380-81 as a key event:
'There was great support for the civic at this time and many
branches were set up- The people were asked to boycott the rent
increases, which was successful in some areas- The Carom, of 10
took the case to court to stop the increases- And, in the
meantime, support began to dwindle. The civic did not have the
strength to sustain the campaign- Communication and report backs
to the people did not take place and demoralisation began to set
in.-.'
The minutes later record that 'in taking the matter to court, wo took
the struggle out of the hands of the people'- Later:
'The weaknesses of the rents campaign, the -failure of the court
case and our lack of report back to the people, result&d in
demoral isatian. For some o-f the people, it meant that the civic
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cannot do anything -for them. There seemed to be -fear to report
back to the people after we lost the case. We need to deal with
-failures. We take up issues, when its over, it -fizzles out like
a candle.'
Other weaknesses identified included 'poor coordination o-f the work of
the civic', the lack of an office, 'loss of membership and dwindling
branches* (especially since 1381), and popular perceptions of the SCA'
vat a mass level, the people think that the civic is a "benefit
society" (welfare)'. On the structure of the SCA:
*... members felt that there was a lack of communication between
branches and the Comm. of 10. The feeling was that issues were
often raised at local level and that the Comm. of 10 does not
hear them... Members felt that branches were not very
effective.'
And on perceptions of the leadership:
'The point was made that the community saw the comm. of 10 as
professionals. As educated people who are apart from them. It
was felt that the civic leadership should be more mixed and that
there should be a place for the "Ordinary man" in the street to
serve the people.' C233.
The workshop also highlighted many of the strengths of the SCA. But
this exposure of its weaknesses is particularly important as it helps
explain the character of township politics in Soweto in the early
1980s. The top-down organisational structure of the SCA, its
legalistic approach to the 19S0 rent increase, and its lack of strong
organised roots at a local level, together with the experience of
failure in 1984, and of inactivity in the face of rent increases in
1981 and 1983, reduced the likelihood of the SCA providing direction
and effective leadership during 1984.
The leadership of the original ColO was drawn from the better-off
sections of the population: businessmen and professionals. It was
elected at a meeting of about sixty prominent Soweto figures, and
included5 three businessmen, including the chairman of the Soweto
Traders Association; six professionals, including a doctor, a school
principal, a deputy-principal, another teacher, a priest, and a social
worker; and the tenth member was employed by the South African Council
of Churches. It is unsurprising that the leadership was widely seen
as distinct and conservative, even for some time after major changes
were made of the executive in 1982 and 1384. C243
Throughout the period 1377-84 the ColO/SCA was concerned with both.
civic and national political issues. In 1977 the Committee of Ten
drew up an alternative, and not very radical, blueprint for the
administration of Soweto C253, and in 1978 and 1983 it successfully
opposed elections to the Community/Town Councils. But its civic
concerns generally comprised periodic convulsions caused by the
announcement of rent or busfare increases. The ColO was originally
thought of as a temporary body, for the purpose of drawing up an
alternative blueprint for Soweto C263, and the ColO thereafter seems
to have lack a sense of direction yet alone a plan of action. The
anti-election 'campaign' of 1978 was very piecemeal (see below), and
until 1979 the ColO was ineffective in its opposition to rent
increases, failing to mount any significant opposition in December
1977. An anonymous report in Work in Progress criticised the
Committee of Ten as having ^dissolved into a "newspaper/public
platform" party'. The report alleged that the municipal blueprint did
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not provide for any political participation/ that mass rallies were
seen as the means of public ratification/ and that the ColO was not
concerned with mobilisation or organisation C273.
There is clearly some truth in these allegations. The CoiO did not
organise locally/ and (as the SCA later admitted/ see above) it was
widely regarded as inaccessible. At the same time, however/ Motlana
; himself was enormously popular in Boweto C2B3. The ColO itself began
to face up to its organisational problems when further rent increases
were announced in September 1379. It recognised that it could not
provide the necessary organisation and direction, and decided to
transform itself into a new SCA- The SCA was launched at a well-
attended two-day conference in Orlando West. Its first task/ it
declared, would be to give residents a chance to discuss the rent
increase in a public meeting. However/ the Soweto Councils suspended
the increase in the face of popular opposition (including from
councillors and Inkatha). C293
In July 1980 another rent increase was proposed. This immediately
gave rise to some protest on the streets. For example women from
Mofolo South demonstrated. Thousands of angry residents turned out in
protest when Koornhof visited Soweto in October 1980. The SCA's
response, together with AZAPO/ was to call for a boycott of the
increase whilst contesting the legality of the increase in court. The
rent boycott was unevenly supported/ but even in areas where it was at
first partially successful it seems to have been gradually broken
after eviction notices were sent out and township superintendents were
instructed to apply in court for authorisation to recover rent arrears
through attaching and selling household property. The legal case was
dismissed with costs in the Rand Supreme Court in December. C3O3
The failure of the anti-rent increase campaign led to an extended
period of little activity by the SCA. In an interview in 1982/ the
ColO chairman Nthatho Motlana claimed that the SCA was still 'as
active as ever'/ but then contradicted himself admitting that it had
not been so active because (he said) there had been no immediate
issues facing residents. No annual conference was held in 1981. Rent
increases were very ineffectively opposed. At the 1982 SCA annual
conference Motlana said that *the period between 1980 and December
1982 have not been easy ones for the civic association'/ emphasising
increased repression and harassment- A new ColO was elected/
 r.
including five new members (including Amos Masondo and Popo Molefe/
both dynamic unionists). In December 1982 the SCA resolved to
campaign against any elections held under the Black Local Authorities
Act, and in 19B3 provided the impetus for an Ad Hoc Anti-Community
Council Committee which campaigned for an election boycott. E313
But the entire 1980-84 period was later shown to have been marked by
inadequate organisation and activity- Membership fell and several
branches collapsed (including in Moroka/ Dlamini, Emdeni/ parts of
Me?adowlandS/ Dube and Chiawelo)j the Orlando East branch was set back
when two executive members joined the Soweto Council in 19B3 C323.
Only in 1984 did the SCA begin to tackle the problems of organisation
in Soweto- At the SCA meeting of 25 March, the Vevival' of branches
in MeadowlandS/ Orlando East/ and Dube was discussed C333. At the
meeting of 8 April the revival of the Tladi-Moletsane branch was
discussed C343. Organisational workshops were held in June and July.
The minutes of these workshops arid of the SCA's meetings throughout
v' t-hs ye?ar reveal the increasing concern of its members with addressing
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localised issues, such as against water cuts, Putco routes, water and
electricity meter reading, and electricity bills, learning -from the
local successes o-f some of the SCA branches in campaigning over local
issues £353. By August the SCA was already at an advanced stage in
planning an Annual General Meeting in December, had drawn up plans -for
a restructured executive, and noted the need -for a policy document
C3S3. The official report on the December AGM described it as the
most significant in the SCA's history not only because o-f the
*fai—reaching decisions' taken and the context of widespread protest,
but also because it was '-well attended and dominated by the
organisation's grassroot membership'- Reveallingly, the report stated
that the two most significant issues in the AGM were (1) the nature of
a civic organisation, with it being emphasised that a civic
organisation did link local issues with political contradictions, but
did not play a political <ie national political) role, and (2)
•"del iberations made it very clear that the Committee of Ten should be
replaced by structures that can more easily facilitate rank and file
participation in the organisation'. Only two members of the old
executive committee (Motlana and MasondD) were re-elected. C37D
An increasing focus on local issues was encouraged by the emergence of
the United Democratic Front, to which the SCA affiliated (amidst some
confusion, and despite the reservations of some members) in October
1984 r.383. Especially after the changes in leadership in December the
SCA executive had very strong links with the UDF.
Whilst- the rhetoric of a grassroot-orientation should not be taken as
a reflection of practice, it does indicate both a newly deepened sense
of direction and a recognition of the inadequacies of SCA activity
since 1979. The practices of the SCA show strong continuities as well
as changes from late 1984. Members of the SCA, for example,
increasingly involved themselves in attempts to resolve the growing
educational crisis through the formation of a Soweto Parents Committee
(which later became the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee, SFCC) along
the lines of the Black Parents Association and Committee of Ten of
1976-77 C393. But the reorientation of civic leadership did
facilitate the organisational developments that led to .both the
emergence of street committees (in some areas) and the rent boycott in
19S6 C4O3.
The SCA only began to bridge the gulf between Soweto-wide and more
localised organisation during 1384. No other political organisation
or movement came close to doing the same. Some did not establish
local structures, although their support was often locally concent-
rated, whilst others remained localised, often with thin support.
AZAPO established a Soweto branch soon after its launch in 1379. Its
first chairperson was Popo Molefe, later SCA secretary and UDF general
secretary (Molefe resigned from AZAPO in early 13B1) C413. AZAPO in
Soweto remained in the shadow of the ColO/SCA, with which it
maintained a curiously ambiguous position until early 1984- It failed
to establish local branches (although it had significant support in
areas such as Dhlamini, Phiri and Senaoane), but participated as a
minor partner in various campaigns (against rent increases in 1380,
Republic Day and busfare increases in 1331, the BLA elections in
1983). Several member5 of the initial Committee of Ten were prominent
former leaders in the Black Consciousness movement: the Rev.
Mashwabada Mayathula had been the first chairman of the Black Persons
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Convention (BPC), Fanyana Mazibuko had been BPC national secretary
Ramsey Ramokgopa had been on the Transvaal BPC executive, and Tom
Manthatha was a -former BC stalwart C423- From about 1379 tensions
grew between AZAPO and the emerging *Charterist' camp,, with AZAPD
concerned with the ideological prominence o-f the ANC the leadership
o-f the Release Mandela Committee (Aubrey Mokoena, an enthusiastic
Charterist, and the expelled AZAPO president Curtis Nkondo), and the
organisational influence of white and Indian leaders in black
politics- But in Soweto the ColO/SCA steered some kind o-f a middle
path, embracing members with di-f-ferent ideological affiliations. In
1984, however, relations between AZAPD and the UDF soured dramatic-
ally, with strong attacks on the latter at the fourth AZAPO Congress
in January C433- By mid-year there was a strong movement within the
SCA to affiliate to the UDF, which it finally did in October C443.
The Soweto Youth Congress (SOYCO) was formed in July 1983, as one of a
number of youth congresses formed in response to the decision of CDSAS
to restrict itself to school students- SOYCO held regular and
well-attended meetings, but does not seem to have played a central
role in township politics as a whole- Unlike the SCA, SOYCO
affiliated to the UDF prior to its launch in August 1983. C4B3
The weakness of student organisation in Soweto remains something of an
enigma- In 1983 there had been educationally-related protests in a
number of Soweto schools (especially at Ibhongo High in Dhlamini,
Progress Secondary, and Orlando High), and there were a few further
protests in 1984 (principally at Ibhongo again) C433. Furthermore,
two members of the COSAS national executive were from Soweto (Kenny
Fihla and Jabu Khumalo). Yet there were COSAS structures in only a
few Soweto schools, and there were very few protests in Soweto in
comparison with Pretoria, the East Rand, or the Eastern Cape- COSAS
itself recognised the weaknesses if its organisation. For example, in
April 1984 a Transvaal Regional Meeting noted that *the branches were
facing problems which were contributing towards weakening the
organisation in the Transvaal*, the first two problems listed being
M a ) lack of direction and coordinating on the issues to taken Csic3
branches, <b) lack of constant communication between the branches and
Executive' C5O3- Ibhongo High may well have been atypically well
organised and militant in part because Dhlamini is an AZAPO
stronghold, and the ideological debates between COSAS and AZASM (the
Asanian Students Movement) constructively fuelled general student
mobilisation C513. Besides the absence of strong Soweto branch
organisation, two further factors that might help explain the
quiescence of Soweto students were their relatively good employment
prospects compared to other regions (although they were still poor)
and the reluctance of Soweto students to boycott classes, many of them
having lost at least two years in 1376-77. It is also unclear how
widely provocative issues such as the age limit were being enforced.
Finally, it is unwise to dismiss conservative political movements. In
Soweto these included Inkatha, the Sofasonke Party, the Makgotla, and
the Russians. The scale of support for Inkatha is difficult to
estimate. Opinion polls suggest a constant decline in support for
Buthelezi and Inkatha in the PWV, from 2BX (1977) to 17"/- (1301) and
just 5X (1985) C453. But Zulu-speakers predominate in Soweto, and
Buthelezi continues to attract large crowds to his annual rallies in
Soweto. In April 1394 10,000 people gathered to hear him speak, and
in November 1985 between 15,000-30,000 were reported to have packed
Jabul ani Arnphi theatre- f or a "prayer- meet ing f or un ity * I ed by
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Buthelezi C4S3. In 1979 Inkatha claimed 20 branches and over 1 000
paid-up members - a credible claim. But in 19S2 it claimed 67 000
members (and 8 branches, in Zola,, Errideni, Dube, Senaoane, Mo-folo
Orlando East and West, and Dhlamini), and in 19B3 claimed 120,000
members in 29 branches. Inkatha's membership claims are generally
very suspect, and these Soweto -figures are completely implausible.
Inkatha did take up various local campaigns (including shack
demolition and rent increases) but remained a minor participant
Soweto politics. C47J in
So-Fasonke clearly enjoyed support among some sections o-f the
population, especially elderly Zulu-speakers and in Jabavu (widely
acknowledged as a So-fasonke stronghold) and among squatters in Orlando
East. In 1984 So-fasonke implausibly claimed a registered membership
of 180,000 in 33 branches- In 1981-83 So-fasonke worked with the local
branch o-f the SCA in opposition to shack demolition in Orlando East.,
and its leading role in that campaign was probably a contributing
•factor to the demise o-f the SCA branch C523. The popularity, albeit
limited, o-f So-fasonke was illustrated in the December 1983 council
Support -for the makgotla and the Russians
is di-f-ficult to assess. The former are said
Naledi, and the latter in Phiri and Mapetla.
Association was alleged to have used Russians
elections (see below)
(which might overlap)
have some strength in
1982 the Soweto Ta;:i
to
In
in
a series o-f bloody clashes with the Naledi Taxi Association, who used
*Zulu vigilantes', in a struggle -for taxi routes C533. In December
1986 Russians in Phiri and Mapetla clashed with ^comrades*1 who
overzealously sought to en-force the *black Christmas-1 lights out
campaign. Many young residents fled the area as the Russians cleared
it o-f ^comrades'. C543
The Role o-f the Soweto Councils in Township Politics
I have elsewhere argued that, in other PWV townships, changes in
economic, social and moral relations within the community during the
period between 1977 and 1983 underlay and shaped subsequent popular
protest. The township '•community' was increasingly -fragmented and
recast. Two processes were particularly important in this. First,
economic and social differentiation (see above). Secondly, the
reorganisation of local government in the townships with the estab-
lishment of Community and later Town Councils transformed local
political relations. In some townships, members of Advisory Boards
and even Urban Bantu Councils had some limited support as inter-
mediaries (or patrons) between residents and local authority. The
members of the new Community Councils initially inherited this
support, but they were increasingly seen to abuse their extended
powers, for example over the allocation of housing, to enrich them-
selves and a few supporters to the detriment of their supposed
constituents- The nature of patronage relations changed, and counc
illors came to be seen as less accountable and unacceptably corrupt.
The imposition of recurrent rent increases widely underlined the
perceived violation of ^community* obligations and responsibilities.
Many of the protests of 19S4-85 began as protests against such
violations. Hostility to the councillors was often compounded by tn
conspicuous overlap between councils and recently-acquired affluenc ,
with new economic and political relations consequently being recas
together. C55D
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In Soweto, possibly uniquely in the PwV, the Community and To«jn
Councillors unambiguously lacked any significant legitimacy ur suppo-t
•from the outset, and they never constituted an important reference
point in Soweto politics. The absence of newly bitter popular- ay(ofcr-
against them in 1984 seems to have been an important factor in the
relative Quiescence' of Soweto.
The widespread ambivalence to the Community and Town Councillors in
Soweto resulted primarily from the circumstances of the Councils'
establishment, but was compounded by the actions of the councillors in
office and the continued opposition to the Councils from important
local political organisations- The three Community Councils in
Greater Soweto <ie the Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow Councils)
were established in late 1977 after the collapse of the Soweto Urban
Bantu Council (UBC) in June 1977- The Community Councils were widely
regarded as just remodelled UBCs, especially since many of the leading
candidates in the elections were prominent former Urban Bantu
Councillors, including the last two UBC chairmen, Edward Thebeh&li
<who had been chairman during the rent debacle) and Amos Makhan/a.
Candidates for election to the Community Council therefore inherited
the ambivalence and hostility formerly felt for the UBC. Support for
the UBC had fallen steadily from its establishment in 1968, with the
average poll in elections being 32"/- (19S8), 21% < 1971) and 14% (1374),
as the UBC came to be seen as the ^Useless Boys Club*. The UBC
finally collapsed in the face of popular recognition of its impotence,
after protests organised by the Soweto Students Representative Council
succeeded in having WRAB suspend a rent increase when the UBC's own
^protests' had failed. C5S3
The average polls in the Community Council elections in February/April
1978 was just €% (these percentages are of registered voters, who
probably comprise at most a bare majority of technically eligible
voters yet alone the total adult population) C573. As Ishmael
Mkhabela, & Black Consciousness-oriented civic leader- commented- *The
people? have not forgotten the grievances which led them to reject the
Urban Bantu Council- The people are tired of voting for useless and
ineffective bodies.' C583 Political organisations opposed to the
Community Councils emphasised the inadequacy of the Councils' powers,
which of course resonated with the popular percption of the Councils
as just reborn UECs. These organisations, including both Inkatha and
the conservative Makgotla, also argued that the elections should be
boycotted because of the detention of the Committee of Ten and other
political activists. Buthelezi told a meeting of 15,000 people in
Jabulani Amphitheatre that 'We in Inkatha stand four—square behind the
Committee of Ten', and described participation in the elections as *an
act of treachery'. Inkatha threatened to expel any member who stood
for election in February, and Edward Thebehali had to announce his
resignation from Inkatha when he announced his candidacy. The Soweto
Makgntla organisation expelled one of its leading members, Letsatsi
Radebe, for participating, splitting itself in the process. In a
clear attempt to boost support before the April elections, the
Government released Mot1 ana. In response Inkatha announced that
members could stand in an individual capacity, but as an organisation
it maintained its rejection. C533
In subsequent elections polls actually rose, although not by wuc"*
two Soweto Community Council by-elections in June 1978, the polls
13.42 and 14.2V.. ThD average polls in elections for the Diepmedow
nobsoiv/ii lc Comwiur. i t.y Councils in September- 1978 were 23-9"/-
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42.0^ respectivly. The polls were clearly higher than during February
and Aprils and I am unable yet. to account adequately -for this.
Further elections to the Community Councils were repeatedly postponed
by the Government- C601
In December 19S3 elections were held in Soweto under the new Black
Local Authorities Act- A survey conducted in October predicted a
39-40"/. turnout, Knoetze said a 257- poll in Soweto would be
Reasonable', and The? Star predicted a 22"/. poll- But the actual poll
turned out to be just 10-7"/- in Soweto itself, 14-£"/n in Diepmeadow,, and
23. GV, in Dobsonville, making an overall average of 1£"/-- Koornhof
claimed that '•although a better voting percentage was predicted... it
is an improvement on the GV. election poll o-f Saweto's Community
Council in 1973. ..* C£13. Soweto was one o-f very -few townships where
the 19S3 poll was higher than the earlier polls in Community Council
elections- As in 1373, the elections were opposed by a wide range of
organisations' the SCA, together with CDSA5, AZASQ, FEDSAW, several
unions,, and < initially) AZAFO, had -formed an Ad Hoc Anti-Community
Council Elections Comrcittee, but it is unclear what impact its
campaign had- Fosters calling -for a boycott o-f the elections were
reported to be very visible at train stations and other prominent
places, but only BOO people attended the -final rally in Regina Mundi
Cr.theriral, which h?.s on several other occasions reached its capacity
nx several thousand (-for £j-:ar/iple on 1£ June anniversaries). Inkatha
alsc c£sne out in opposition to the elections- Whilst Buthelezi and
othsr Inkatha leaders had been indicating since 1930 that Inkatha
might or even would participate in -forthcoming elections, the
sugaestion that the Black Local Authorities were a substitute -for
national political representation caused Buthelezi to reject the
elections- C623
The Soweto Council had, like other councils, raised rents, been
accused o-f corruption, demolished backyard shacks, and evicted rent
defaulters. As Motlana had realised in 1379, without new sources o-f
•finance the Council would have to rely on *
*-.. the iniquitous system of increasing rents..- The state will
then throw responsibility on the Community Council, which will
become the whipping boy. The anger of the people will be
diverted -from the Government to the unfortunate community
councillors.* [£33
It might sesm curious therefore that
in the polls- This limited increase
te discontent over these very issues,
were won by members of the Sofasonke
•former Council Chairman, Thebehali, and his -former deputy, Makhaya).
Sofarsonfce candidates promised reduced rents, leniency towards
defaulters, permanent, home ownership, and even the abol itiovi uf influx
control for people born after- 1343! The Soweto Council's rent
increases, eviction or def aul ters.. and demo I it-ion o-f backyard shacks,
led to some 1 ir/iited support for the popul ist Sof asonke, which had been
formed in an earlier period of crisis over housing (in the Iat-t5
1940s). So-fasonke councillors including Tshabalala, Edward Manyosi,
and Julius Mdlalose had basn the most prominent critics of the Soweto
Community Council from within between 137S and 19B3, and had < for-
ewarn?! e) prominently sr-d successful}' campaigned ag:ii n^t rent increases
in 199!. Two thirds oc ths? T193 voters wore reported to be elderly,
amongst whom So-fasonl;3 had particular appeal- The elections
there was even a small increase
seems to have been due, however,
1? out of 2? contested seats
Party (who defeated both the
1979-B4
nonetheless constituted
Councils. C643
a second overwhelming rejection o-f the
case
The State and Soweto
Even be-fore 1976 Soweto posed a particular problem -for the state. its
distance -from any bantustan and the impossibility of removing it posed
administrative problems that required some re-form o-f urban policy even
be-fore the revolt of 197S-77 prompted reform as a counter-revolution-
ary necessity. Before June 1976 the only legislative evidence of
urban reform was the reintroduction o-? the 30-year leasehold scheme.
Following the revolt, the urban Veform process' accelerated- In the
of Soweto, *reformJ involved a very substantial development
p g a m m e , with Soweto unambiguously prioritised in state policy.
Mare importantly, in terms of the effects on Soweto politics, the
state"5 wariness of further revolt led it to hold back from raising
rents to the ^economic' level required to fully finance development
<as was state policy). A key factor in the escalation of protest in
the Vaal Triangle, East Rand and Pretoria townships during 1984 was
discontent over the? rent increases that were introduced to pay for
urban development and administration. The subsidisation of rents in
Sowoto reduced the likelihood of both protests and revolt.
The development of Soweto was clearly envisaged vary soon after the
revolt of 197S-77. An official ^scientific survey1 that, looked at
*the constraints and vexations among the Black people in that urban
area* identified housing, wages, arid social amenities as the three
most important issues T653. Connie Mulder, the new Minister Df Plural
Relations and Develnpment < as the former Department of Bantu
Administration had been tellingly renamed), said in January 137B that
he aimed to make Soweto the most beautiful black city in Africa C£G3,
and the following month he told Parliament that1
*In my view, nothing will alleviate the political tensions and
fever sooner than to attend to these matters at this stage?...
Consequently I intend giving immediate attention to the drafting
of a five-year plan for the urban Black man... *
Subsequent debate revolved around what was to be the key issue in the
development of Sowets and other townships over the following decade:
the? question ox money. Mulder er.iphasiscd the official position1
*--. there arc Plack people in our- White residential areas and
while they are hers and fire going to be here, it is my ideal to
malco the circumstances in which they ar-s living as pleasant and
attractive as possible for them B t b t i
facilitsc and amenities such as
without paying part of the cost thsmselves.£673
Over the? following decade state officials repeatedly emphasised that
residents should pay the whole cost of development, over time. In
practice., however., Soweto's residents paid only part of the cost.
It was not. until 197? that the state's re-form plans for- Soweto really
not underway. This docs not seero to have been due to any anti-
reformist bias on the part of the ^verkrar.ipte' Connie Mulder, who in
his. own way was a reformist (although of course he was not prepared to
compromise <?.t all over the ISSUE o-f cit. i 2 en ship > • It. is possible that
the state's lack of decisivpness was duo to the general paralysis that
affected it- during the Mul derate cr isis. In 1573, wi t!i a now Pr i;no
ut ... no one can obta n
these in their residential areas
hsmselves.* £6
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Minister (Botha) and a new Minister o-f Plural Relation.-.* ^r,d
Development <Koornhof, who renamed it the Depart meant of Coopei
and Development, CAD), plans for accelerated developfi.t-r.h pr-oc
In September 1979 Botha visited Soweto and announced thai the G
merit would cancel a Rl 1.5m debt owed by the Soweto Community Co
C6B3. When the Deputy-minister of CAD, George Morrison, was a^
the National Party Free State Congress why the Government did u
write o-F-F other townships' debts, he replied that Soneto was *•«
showpiece to the world* tSSl. The Cabinet decided to * improve
quality o-f life* in Soweto (in line with the recomvtundations of
Riekert Reports and implicitly the -forthcoming Gillie Report),
number- o-f important appointments were consequently made* Man it-
Mulder, brother of the now disgraced Connie Mulder, resigned ^ ^
Chairman in October 1979, to be succeeded by the -former Chief D
o-f the Vasl Triangle Administration Board, John Knoetze, In No
Koornho-f appointed Louis Rive, a former Postmaster-Gene^al, i*±
a "special government, project to develop FWV townships, osptciu.;
Scwsto. Rive vias to rhair a new Greater Soweto Planiiirig Counci
include Knoetzs and the chairmen of the three community council
Greatsr Sowsvto, and a Sowsto Planning Council that included him
Kno?t7=? and the Sovietc Council chairman. Rive was responsible
Koornhcv?, and reported to the State Security Council. C7O3
l.^ J at
t h e
ir c-ctor
l.;^d of
\ j to
i i n
SBl f ,
to
The appointment o-f Knoetze and Rive was an indication UT both
perceived importance oF Soweto and the necessary aarins." of p g
with its development- Knoetze had an excellent record in tht. VL;U1
Triangle- As recently as September 1373, when rent increases had been
suspended in Soweto si'd strongly opposed on the East Rand/ Kfioet^ t?
boasted that there had been no prcblem increasing rente ivi the V««l
C713. Mere importantly, the Vaal was the part of the PWV least-
a-f-fected by the events of 1376-77, with only isolated arid sporadic
incidents (come of which the Cillie Report blamed ovi agitators bu^^d
in from Soi-Joto!). Ac Matthew Chaslcalson has strongly argued in
unpublished work, state administration in the- Vaal Triangle haJ lor^
bssr: censidereri a model for the rest of the country- Furt-heriMor-i-, «s»
ChaskaTson has shONn, this SUCCESS was in par-t due to the elaboration
of V-efor-mist' state policies at s local level which were onl/ latt-r
to bs taken up as national pal icy, in particular providing f ur-
Bub^tarftial private sector involvement in the provision or houan'ij
Knsctrc and Rive wera seen, as one business leaded- put i t , .
^pragmatic and •flexible* and *s strongwilled innovator ._aod '
primini^trator * r.733- 0Yi5 newspaper said Rive had made the? i
*the shewniece o-f eff ic isnt s ta te departments'* and said he
w^th .^  w'ctaehorical mazhats to hack away the red tape'.; the
**.->. i 1 dsscr ibsd him as * a man wi th a h i s t a r i c missi on' / to s
1 * i c» i i t-
s kids irtR their education in Angola or Russia! t
t '
p g
appointment of Knostre and Rive reflected the Gover-nn.ofit ' -
hperception that t-ho d^vslapriient of Soweto requireu an
could cut through normal bureaucratic obduracy and develop new
o-f urban admin i s t r at io"i and development. Intcirestina^y / both
appointment of Krcoetzo and the rePcrfj. of s t a t e policy to draw
private? sector wsra fulV;- in l ine with Connie Mulder's policy
Mulder war fw"1. 1 of praizz- for t.he Vaal Tr-ianyl-
introduccc* thi? leTjisJation providing for 95-year 1
sitp-and-Ecr vice sclisr.'n??. Hs al so approved an fclt;ctr i
that war. turned dour, by WPAT5, oiitE-nr.itjl / because? it **
the
in the
during
L
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C753. Manie Mulder, on the other hand, was widely thought to be
opposed to a growing role for the private sector, and was accused of
foot-dragging over development C7S1.
Senior local state officials shared the Government's identification of
the development of Soweto as a priority. Rive described Soweto as
*the mirror of South Africa's soulJ (in 1981), and Soweto Council
Chief Executive (ie Town Clerk) Nico Mai an defended the payment of
higher ^allowances' to Mayor Thebehali than the Johannesburg City
Council Mayor received by saying5
*Soweto ic the second largest city in South Africa. The chairman
of the council sits in the hottest seat in South Africa and the
hottest in the world as far as local government is concerned-..'
C773.
The private sector also identified Soweto as the top priority for
devcslnpmcnt- £781 -
Tr*o electrification of Soweto had been identified by the Government as
a priority sines 197S at least- In March 1379 Koornhof approved an
electrification plan (which Rive was to oversee). In October 1380
Kosrnhof announced an upgrading plan, although not along the lines
that Rivr hod proposed in his report to the Minister. Rive had put
*the lowest passible cost' of upgrading existing infrastructure at
P244m, but Koornhof only announced a R150m plan C793, In practice,
inflation pushed the cost up to an estimated R33£rn by July 19B1, and
P440m by mid 19S3. Figures for the outstanding loans, of WRAB and the
West Rand councils are provided in Appendix C, Table 2. Capital
expenditure on the electrification and upgrading projects was slow to
take off, but by 1332-83 was proceeding rapidly. By July 1384, there
were almost £3C0m in outstanding loans on these projects. The state's
capital expenditure programme in Soweto fitted state objectives other
than just the development of Soweto- First, it provided an economic
boost -for an area which the state was reluctant to further develop
industrially (preferring industrial growth along the Brits-Rosslyvi-
Pretcria-Eronlihorstpruit axis and on the far East Rand) C303.
Secondly, the? government hoped that investment in the construction
industry would help to stimulate economic growth without adversely
affective tho balance of payments (this was especially important in
1978-91 >~
Progress was slowar.t ss regards the provision of housing. B/ 1U73 the
Government envisaged that employers and township residents should play
a major part in housing provision. By 1330 the Government w«s
considering tho possibilities for speculative involvement by the
private sector. This was recommended by the Viljoen Committee to
Investigate Private Sector Involvement in Resolving the Housing
Backlog in Soweto in July 1381. The Committee, which included
Kncetze.. proposed a five-year housing programme, which would provide
55,000 new units (meeting both the backlog and the continued growth in
demand). Of these, 13.600 would be built by the state for rent ing to
lew-income households, 16,300 would be built by the state for sale,
and over 25,000 would be built by the private sector. The cost to the
stato, including land purchases and the provision of services to new
sites, would be almost R500m. The cost to the private sector would be
almost R280m C823. In practice, nowhere near this amount wai spev.t by
either- the public or private- sectors. Appendix E shows housing
provi sion in Soweto. Between 1378 and 1334, on 1 y 2302 houim& vwsr u-
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built by the state and 2693 by the private sector. The slow p
in housing provision was advanced as a reason -for Rive's resignation
•from the Soweto Planning Councils in 19S2 CB33.
State policy was that urban development and administration should be
financed without recourse to central state subsidisation. State
expenditure, and the repayment o-f capital loans over the long-term,
would be -financed out of locally raised revenue, -for the most part
comprising rents and service charges- From the mid-1970s the WRAB ran
increasing de-ficts as expenditure rose, as the pro-fits -from municipal
beer and liquor sales (previously used to subsidise other expenditure)
were -falling, and as rentals were not increased to an ''economic-1 level
(see Appendix C, Tables i and 3). Koornhof, Rive, Knoetze and other
officials routinely stated their commitment to an economic rentals
policy. For example, in 1931 Knoetze announced that the existing R30
difference between current and economic rental would be phased out,
arsd claimed that 85% of Scweto households could afford economic
rentals C84D. But. in practice the Sowsto administrators were
sxtremaly wary of increasing rents too much or too fast. Rents
continued to be lower than their ^economic' levels, and in practice
they therefore* continued to be significantly subsidised.
Appendix D shows the growth of rents (including all fixed service
charges and levies) in Sowsto. By comparison/ rents in the Vaal were
approximately the same until 1932, after which they rose much faster,
despite the much higher levels of capital expenditure in Soweto. The
subsidy on SowetD rents (ie the difference between the existing and
^economic rentals') was officially put at R30 per month per house in
June 19S0, R20pm per house in October 1981, and RISpm per house in mid
1933 T853. To finance these deficits, investments were depleted,
debts incurred, and the Government periodically cancelled sums of debt
(Ril.Sm in 1979, and R33m in March 19B3) CS63. WRAB received R91m in
bridging loans between 1977-78 and 1984-S5 (the aggregate for all
other Administration Boards was R£Bm over the same period) C873.
Furthermore, the state also subsidised loans for capital expenditure/
paying the first four years' interest on the loans for the upgrading
project, and providing low interest loans from other state
for part of the electrification project.
Conclusion •• Soweto,
Four differences between Soweto and other townships in the PWV stand
out- the social structure of Soweto was unusually differentiated, with
a relative? lack cf social cohesion; good access for- some to relatively
high income opportunities, the state's prioritisation of urban
development and its subsidisation of rents reduced the inteiisi i. >• of
material grievances for' many residents; the chronic unimportance of
the Soweto Council in township pal itics removed a potential f oi_u&. for
discontent; and the? character of apposition politics and the
CKperienca of struggle during the period 1977-84 militated «ayjins.t.
mass protest in the r>iid-l?30s. A fifth factor might be add^d the
stnte'r. use of relatively sophisticated policing. This is ^a-ry
to assess, but it seem andifficult
pnl irir in Soweto wers better informed,
n-.n-t? restrained than their counterparts
for- rt:rnn-iple.
cursory examination that the
rs appropriately uqui
in the Eastern Cape or
and
Vaal
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These -factors underlie the general quiescence of Soweto during 1384
and most of 1985. During this period there were only sporadic,
transitory and disperate? incidents. Throughout 1385 there was very
little1 protest in the Soweto's schools- There was a brie-f boycott in
Ibhongo Secondary School when schools reopened in January, over the
exclusion o-f students because o-f exam -failure or the age limit.
During August and early September never more than six schools were
involved in protests, at a time when over 150 schools nationwide were
being boycotted CBB3. On 26 September schools reopened after the
September break, but students were sent home at 10am because of the
"•climate' in the township: it was the day of the funeral of Bong an i
Khumalo, secretary of COSAS in Soweto, who had been shot and killed by
police on 13 September- From the following day on, however,
attendance at Soweto schools was reported to be *normal * (although
school boycotts continued in the Vaal, East Rand, and especially
Eastern Cape). Only four out of about 300 schools affected by
protests in early October were in Soweto. C39T
From 12 September there were more numerous minor incidents, easily
contained by a heavy police presence. Khumalo was one of very few
casualties o-f police action- The Release Mandela Committee called for
a stayaway on 17 September, which was partially effective on that day,
and ps?tere?d on the next through poor organisation C9O3. The
announcement of increased service charges and levies at the end of
June seemed to proveks little resistance, but was nonetheless largely
shelved in September because of the *uv»rest' t913» ^Considerable
support' was reported in Soweto for the 5/S November Transvaal
stayaway - but it was much less than in the Vaal or East Rand C32J.
There were at least 24 attacks on 17 council lors, ex—council lors or-
leading Sofasonke members in Soweto during 1334, but none were killed,
and no councillors fled the township- Unlike in the Vaal (and in
Soweto in August 1386) these attacks were not made by crowds of
residents but rather by individual saboteurs C333.
Considering the size and perceived importance of Soweto, and its
history of revolt in 197S-77, administrators and police in the area
must have? been fairly pleased with what they no doubt took to be the
success of their policies- Even in the earl/ 1980s Ministers were
claiming that state polices had made Soweto residents happy and
content. In 1932 Koornho-f said that just two years before Soweto had
been a ^stinking slurr/, but it was now '•becoming an outstanding
•success story' [943
Of course, Soweto now seems less exemplary than it did three years
ago. School boycotts spread widely through Soweto in late 19B5 and
1986, local rent boycotts began in early 19BS and spread Soweto-wide
from June, a partial network of street committees was established in
some areas, residents resisted the state in a series of bloody
conflicts (beginning with the "White City War" of August. 1S8G), and
councillors fled the township.
Nonetheless, many aspects of the development strategy ir< Sow^to were
later incorporated into Ft ore wide-ranging state polity. For- example,
there appear to be? sor.-.c- similarities betwEEn the functioning of the
Sr»iir>tc Planning Council ir. the e^rly 1930s and the Joint Management
? has T-.OV} in principle bees institutionalised through the
sl ServiccG Cnir.-ic i\ r;.- a "id the son i or officials (Gtevu Burger,
Soweto 197B-B4
Piet Genis) in Alexandra, widely thought to be a test-case in
administration and development now, were -formerly officials in the
Soweto adrn i n i str at i on.
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Appendix A* Occupation by economic sector by PWV area, 1980 - y. of
economically active population
Economic sector JHBG
Agric, -forestry, f ishing 0.6
Mining, quarrying 0.7
Manufacturing 20-6
Electricity, gas, water 0.3
Construct ion 3-7
Services 58-4
Other 15-2
Services subsectors
Commerce, catering, hotels 1S-5
Transport, communications 3-6
Finance, insurance, etc 3-6
Personal/household services 20«4
Other services 12.3
Manufacturing sub-sectors
ER
1.4
6.3
35.1
0.8
3-5
38.2
14.1
10.3
4.6
1-0
14-5
7.S
VAAL
5.8
3.8
34.4
2.6
5.2
37.1
11.1
9.6
2.8
0.6
16.4
7.7
PTA
4,8
0-3
16.5
0-4
5-9
62-5
3.8
13.3
5. 1
1.7
25.4
16.8
•food, beverage, tobacco 2.8
textiles, clothing, -footwear 4.6
printing h publishing 1.7
chemicals and other non-
metallic products 4.5
iron & steel and other metal
basic industries 0-6
metal products 5.5
other 1.0
3.6
1.3
0-3
11-0
5.1
13-3
0.5
1.3
0.4
0.1
11.3
11.3
3.8
0.1
2.0
0.6
0.3
2.6
4.1
6.7
0.2
JHBG = Johannesburg and Randburg census districts, including Alexandra
as well as Soweto, excluding Dobsonville. Soweto residents
comprise 8O5i of this category-
ER- East Rand census region, including Katlehong, Thokoza, Vosloorus,
Tenthisa, Daveyton, and Wattville.
VAAL' Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark census districts, including
Ssbokeng, Sharpeville, Evaton, Bophelong, and Boipatong <together
comprising 74"/. of the category) and white residential areas.
PTA: Pretoria and Wonderboom census districts, including Mamelodi,
Atteridgeville/Saul5ville and Soshanguve (together comprising
91% of the category) and white residential areas.
Source1 Population Census 1980, report nos 02-80-19 (pp332-341),
02-30-20 <pP53B-547), 02-80-23 <pp2292-301 ), and 02-80-22 (Pp4G7"476).
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Appendix B' Comparative income distribution1 Percentage o-f households
with income in different income groups in different PWV areas
Table 1
Below R4000 pa (in 1385 prices)=
1375
13B0
1385
Above R12000 pa (in 1385 prices)•
1975
1380
1985
PTA WR/ER JHBG VflAL
27.3
13-1
20-0
11-1
15.4
22-8
15.8
13.3
3-7
14.0
14.4
21.3
23.2
14.7
3.3
na
22-7
26.1
na
10.2
25-1 13-3 25.1 15.3
PTA - Pretoria (sample froro Marr.elodi and Atteridgeville)
WR/ER - Wc?st and East Rand (sample from Dave/ton, Dobsonville,
Kagiso, Katlehong and Tenibisa)
JHBG - Johannesburg (sample -from Soweto)
VAAL - Vaal Triangle (sample from Sebokeng, Evaton, and Sharpeville)
Source- Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa
(UNISA), ^Income and expenditure patterns of urban multiple households
in Pretoria/the West and East Rands/Johannesburg/Vaal Triangle,
1930/19S5', Research Reports nos 94,1, 34.3, 34.4, and 34.7 (Pretoria,
1981) and 130.2, 130-8, 130.9, and 130.13 (Pretoria, 1386).
Table 2
Rand per month
(current prices)
1378 =
1980 =
1382'
0-90
90-170
170+
0-110
110-200
200+
0-130
130-400
400+
JHBG
127-
46
42
15*/.
47
38
107.
52
38
PTft
67.
G7
27
57-
54
41
OTHER
77.
43
44
WR/ER
77.
55
38
PWV
JHBG - Johannesburg, data -for Soweto;
PTA - Pretoria, data for Mamelodi arid Atteridgeville-
OTHER PWV includes FTA and WR/ER sample
Source' Markinor, as repuhlished in various editions of the South
African Institute of Race Relations' annual Race Relations Survey,
197S-82.
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Appendix C» Financial statistics -for the West Rand Administration /
Development Board and Greater Soweto Councils
This data includes accounts for WRAB (1973-74 to 1982-B3), WRDB
(1983-84), and the Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow Councils (for
the last 7 months of 19B3-B4). The WRAB/DB data covers not only
Greater Soweto, but also the other areas in its jurisdiction including
Alexandra, Kagiso, Mohlakeng, Munsieville, and Bekkersdal. There is
therefore a slight break in the data between 1982-83 and 19B3-84, with
data for the later fiscal .year excluding the accounts for the
Alexandra and Kagiso Councils. If these are included, the 19B3-B4
data is as presented under "1383-84*".
Table 1 * ftggre income arid expenditure accounts
Fiscal Beer/
1 icjuor
profits
Gsneral Levy
account funds
surplus sur pi us
(Em) (Rm)
1973-
1974-
1975-
1976-
1977-
1978-
1979-
1980-
19B1-
1982-
1983-
19S3-
74
75
•76
•77
•78
•73
•80
•81
-82
-83
-84
-84*
3.8
6.3
6.7
3.5
3.0
5.2
4.1
2.4
4.3
4.7
2.0
2.3
-6.0
-0.0
-6.3
-7.3
-11.0
-9.5
•11.6
-16.5
-13.6
-22.2
-16.8
-1B.S
-0.2
-1.1
0.9
1.3
1.4
0.9
0.9
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.4
TOTAL
SURPLUS
(Rm>
-2.4
-2.8
1.3
-2.4
-6.7
-3.5
-6.6
-13.5
-8.7
-16.9
-14.3
-15.9
Accum. deficit
on general
account, end-yr
<Rrfi)
1.8
17.3
19.5
14.8
6.8
2.7
-4.2
-18.3
-32.9
-50.1
-66.6
-68.2
"Levy funds" include the Bantu Services, School, Sports and Recreation
Facilities, and Community Facilities Levy Funds.
Table 2' Outstanding loans
Fiscal
year**
(end-yr)
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-7B
1978-79
1979-80
1980-B1
19B1-82
198^-83
1983-84
Capital
account
(Rm)
61.
£4-
63.
£1*
* 7.6
8.6
25.3
16. 1
10.S
,11.4
306.
Housing
account
(Rm)
6
3
6
7
55.5
59.4
68. 1
102.6
123.3
195.S
Electrif-
ication
project
(Rro)
20.0
20.0
83.0
146.0
23S.
Upgrad-
ing
project
(Rm)
34.5
109.7
5
TOTAL
ALL
ACCOUNTS
(Rm)
61.6
64.3
63.6
61.7
63.1
68.0
113.4
138.7
25?. 7
4£2.9
£05. 4
("'»£. 0
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Table 3= Deficits
rental and other-
Fiscal
year**
1978-73
1979-80
19S0-B1
1981-82
19B2-B3
on the provision of electricity and water
arrears
Electricity supply
deficit
<Rm)
1.8
l.S
0.6
2.7
(% of
revenue)
127
63
12
37
Water
def
<Rro>
3.9
2.5
4.2
supply
icit
<% of
revenue)
£1
27
27
, and
Arrears (end-vr )
Electric-
ity/water
(Rm)
0.7
0.8
2.2
3.1
3.4
Rents
(Rm)
1.0
1.5
2.4
Data for other years is not presented in the Auditor-General's
reports.
** Fiscal years 1374-75 to 1331-82 were from April to March inclusive;
the 1982-83 fiscal year covered the 15 months -from April 1382 to June
1933 inclusive, to bring the accounts into line with other government
departments; subsequent fiscal years were -from July to June
inclusive. The 1373-74 fiscal year covers only the 3 months July to
March inclusive, after the establishment of the Administration Boards.
Sources *
Reports of the fluditor-General on the Accounts of the West. Rand Area
Bantu Affairs Administration Board (RP 105/137S, 23/1378, 47/1378,
33/1973, 5B/19B0, 3B/1382, 31/1382, 28/1384); West Rand Area
Development Board (RP 35/1385)J and the Town Councils of Soweto (RP
54/19B5), Dobsonville (RP 52/1985), Dieproeadow (RP 55/19B5), Kagiso
(RP 51/1385) and Alexandra (RP/53/1385).
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Appendix D' Rent series, 1976-84.
"Rent" comprises house rents, site rents, and service charges. House
rents vary between houses but were not raised during this period. The
•following data is -for a standard rented 51/6 4-roomed house in Soweto,
without a water meter'
Dec
Apr
Jul
Aug
Oct
Feb
Oct
Mar
Jun
Dec
<by
1977
1978
1978
1980
1980
19B1
1981
1983
19S4
1984
mid 1986)
House rent
(Rand/month)
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
Site rent
(R/month)
B.00
9.75
,11.50
13.32
13.32
13.32
13.32
13.32
Service chgs
CR/month)
3.00
3.00
3.00
18.85
23.30
27.55
22.23'
23.73
29.03
41.03
45.77
TOTAL
(R/month)
14.25
16.00
17.75
22.10
26.45
30. B0
35.80
40.30
45.60
-57.60
62.34
Households' monthly bills would also include electricity charges and
lodgers -fees (where appropriate). House rents are slightly lower -for
smaller houses such as in Klipspruit and Ko-folo. ^Rents' ' are much
higher -For newly-built houses in, -for example, Chiawelo Extension 3,
Pimville Zone 7, Jabulani and Naledi. Rents - including site rents
and service charges - in Dobsonville and Diepkloo-f/Meadowlands are set
by th^ir respective Councils, arid are not the same as in Soweto.
Source' this series is derived -from gazetted Government Notices and
newspaper reports; the Government Notices were R2234 (Government
Gazette 5789, 2B Oct 1977), 1570 (GB 7158, 1 Aug 1980), 2044 (GG 7B12,
25 Sep 1981), and 393 (GG B560, 25 Feb 1983). The 1984 rents -figures
are based on newspaper reports and may well be incorrect.
Appendix E< Housing Units Built in Greater Soweto
J976
1977
1978
.1979
1950
1991
1932
1983
1984
1978-84 2302
Source' Hansard. var ious.
WRAB
441
422
110
220
0
96
800
837
239
By private
sector
210
171
420
457
904
300
231
TOTAL
2G33
320
390
420
553
1704
113?
470
4335
